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INTRODUCTION
In October of 2017, the HarveyWeinstein scandal precipitated a nationwide
awakening about sexual harassment and assault. At least 122 prominent men
were accused of sexual misconduct in the wake of the Weinstein allegations1—
often by large numbers of women.2 After actress Alyssa Milano posted a tweet
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1. Those accused of sexual misconduct after Weinstein have ranged from prominent actors such as
Ben Affleck to former U.S. President George H.W. Bush. See Samantha Cooney,Here Are All the Public
Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, TIME (Nov. 9, 2017),
http://time.com/5015204/harvey-weinstein-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/8V2V-GFRS]. For the original
report of the Weinstein allegations, see Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey,Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/
harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/MN8R-SEHM].
2. Bill Cosby was accused of sexual harassment and assault by sixty women. Carly Mallenbaum et
al., A Complete List of the 60 Bill Cosby Accusers and their Reactions to His Prison Sentence, USA
TODAY (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/04/27/bill-cosby-full-list-
accusers/555144002/ [https://perma.cc/J5AW-GT3B]. Harvey Weinstein was accused of sexual
harassment and assault by eighty-seven women. Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein
Scandal: A Complete List of the 87 Accusers, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/M6
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encouraging women who had been sexually harassed or assaulted to tweet
#MeToo,3 this movement acquired a name.4
The #MeToo movement has sparked widespread story-sharing on social
media, and (to some degree) has resulted in the firing or forced resignations of
powerful men in the entertainment industry and in politics.5 #MeToo has even
implicated the judiciary, as evidenced by the sexual harassment scandal that
preceded the resignation of former Ninth Circuit judge Alex Kozinski.6 The
#MeToo movement almost certainly increased the weight given to the sexual
assault allegations that arose during Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation.7
56-FQCR]. Larry Nassar is reported to have victimized at least 332 women. Rex Santus, Larry Nassar’s
332 Victims Are Getting $425 Million from Michigan State, VICE (May 16, 2018), https://news.vice.com/
en_us/article/9k8yap/larry-nassars-332-victims-are-getting-dollar425-million-from-michigan-state
[https://perma.cc/HS6N-JPB4]. Though most of these allegations have involved male sexual violence
against women, it is important to acknowledge that not all the survivors who have spoken out since the
rise of #MeToo are women. Kevin Spacey has been accused of sexual assault and other types of sexual
misconduct by fifteen men. Maria Puente, Kevin Spacey Scandal: A Complete List of the 15 Accusers,
USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2017/11/07/kevin-spacey-scandal-
complete-list-13-accusers/835739001/ [https://perma.cc/RRU8-CFCZ].
3. While Milano sparked the use of #MeToo for this movement, the phrase was actually coined by
activist Tarana Burke in 2006. Morgan Greene, #MeToo’s Tarana Burke Tells Local Activists Movement
‘By Us and for Us’ Must Include Women of Color, CHI. TRI. (Oct. 11, 2018), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-tarana-burke-me-too-20181010-story.html [https://perma.cc/9A
FR-T4G5].
4. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.
theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/E824
-FQ6J].
5. NBC host Matt Lauer was fired after allegations of “inappropriate sexual behavior in the
workplace.” David Usborne, The Peacock Patriarchy, ESQUIRE (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.esquire.com/
news-politics/a22627827/matt-lauer-nbc-me-too/ [https://perma.cc/Y9TK-9FLX]. Fox News let host Bill
O’Reilly go under similar circumstances. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly is Forced Out
at Fox News, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/business/media/bill-
oreilly-fox-news-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/JCW6-8RZF]. Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Rep.
Blake Farenthold (R-TX) resigned after sexual harassment allegations against them surfaced. See Elana
Schor & Seung Min Kim, Franken Resigns, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/12/07/franken-resigns-285957 [https://perma.cc/2UV4-BZ3Z]; Joe Tacopino, Congressman
Resigns After Using Taxpayer Funds to Settle Sex Harassment Suit, N.Y. POST (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/04/06/congressman-resigns-after-using-taxpayer-funds-to-settle-sex-harassmen
t-suit/ [https://perma.cc/4M37-L62H].
6. Dan Berman & Laura Jarrett, Judge Alex Kozinski, Accused of Sexual Misconduct, Resigns, CNN
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/18/politics/alex-kozinski-resigns/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/T2MU-AAGZ]; Dahlia Lithwick,He Made us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (June 7, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/judge-alex-kozinski-made-us-all-victims-and-accomplices.
html [https://perma.cc/8QCS-XYTM].
7. The people who mobilized and spoke out against Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation largely
adopted the #MeToo framing, and news coverage of the confirmation battle reflected this. See, e.g.,
Emanuella Grinberg, What’s Next for #MeToo After Kavanaugh’s Confirmation, CNN (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/13/us/kavanaugh-whats-next-metoo/index.html [https://perma.cc/E5V5-
NCM4]; Celina Scott-Buechler, It’s Not Surprising that Beneath his Toxic Politics, Brett Kavanaugh is a
Toxic Man, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/celinascott
buechler/our-own-brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford [https://perma.cc/6TYB-XQ82]; Kate Zernike
& Emily Steel, Kavanaugh Battle Shows the Power, and the Limits, of #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/us/politics/kavanaugh-blasey-metoo-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/Q6EX-KUU7].
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However, only a few of the most prominent #MeToo cases—involving Larry
Nassar,8 Bill Cosby,9 and Harvey Weinstein10—have resulted in legal action.
These recent examples demonstrate the importance (and powerful impact)
of scores of women acting in numbers. They can also help contextualize a recent,
unsuccessful women-led movement—the class action brought by 1.5 million
female Wal-Mart11 employees that was denied certification in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes.12 Unsurprisingly, much of the literature on Dukes has focused on
evaluating the decision from a jurisprudential standpoint.13However,Dukes also
illustrates the normative implications of the American legal focus on
individualized (rather than collective) adjudication.
As Frances Olsen points out, classical liberal thought has tended to structure
thinking into seemingly opposing dichotomies, many of which are gendered:
“rational/irrational,” “objective/subjective,” and “principled/personalized” are
only a few.14One dichotomy that is particularly prominent in discussions of civil
procedure is the “individual/group” distinction: discussions of due process often
focus on individualizing trials in order to provide persons an opportunity to be
heard.15 In keeping with this traditional understanding, Justice Scalia’s majority
8. See Scott Cacciola & Victor Mather, Larry Nassar Sentencing: “I Just Signed Your Death
Warrant,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/sports/larry-nassar-
sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/JLG2-A4DX]; Matt Mencarini & Justin A. Hinkley, Michigan State
and 332 of Larry Nassar’s Victims Reach “Historic” $500 Million Settlement, LANSING STATE J. (May
16, 2018), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/05/16/larry-nassar-michigan-state
-settlement-lawsuit/614502002/ [https://perma.cc/4JUL-Z37R].
9. Eric Levenson & Aaron Cooper, Bill Cosby Sentenced to 3 to 10 Years in Prison for Sexual
Assault, CNN (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/us/bill-cosby-sentence-assault/index.
html [https://perma.cc/GYC3-JBUM].
10. Maria Puente,Harvey Weinstein Heads to Court on Sex-Crime Charges as Video Surfaces of him
Touching an Accuser, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2018/
09/12/weinstein-heads-court-video-surfaces-showing-him-touching-accuser/1285157002/ [https://perma.
cc/XN3G-WPRR]; Samantha Schmidt, Enabling Harvey Weinstein’s Sex Life was ‘Condition of
Employment,’ New York Attorney General Says in Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/12/new-york-attorney-general-sues-harvey-
weinstein-and-his-company-for-egregious-civil-rights-violations/ [https://perma.cc/D9BV-5GRW].
11. As of Feb. 1, 2018, Wal-Mart’s legal name has been changed to Walmart. Walmart Changes its
Legal Name to Reflect How Customers Want to Shop, WALMART (Dec. 6, 2017), https://news.walmart.
com/2017/12/05/walmart-changes-its-legal-name-to-reflect-how-customers-want-to-shop [https://perma.
cc/EXR5-6JFJ]. However, since Dukes uses Walmart’s former legal name, this Comment refers to
Walmart as “Wal-Mart” for the sake of clarity.
12. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Sherry E. Clegg, Employment Discrimination Class Actions: Why Plaintiffs Must Cover
all their Bases after the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1087, 1120 (2012); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 395, 477 (2011);
Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 174
(2012); Michael J. Zimmer,Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection out of Protected Cases, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 409, 462 (2012).
14. Frances Olsen, Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective, in SOURCEBOOK
ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 342, 342 (Hilaire Barnett ed., 1997).
15. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976).
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opinion in Dukes described class actions as “‘an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”16
The “usual rule” of individualized adjudication, however, makes it much
more difficult for the American legal system to adequately evaluate claims of
widespread discrimination. When such claims arise from the behavior of
numerous bad actors operating within an institutional context, the adjudicative
focus on individuality tends to obscure how oppressive institutional dynamics
have made the discrimination possible. These dynamics often only become
evident when individual experiences are considered in the aggregate, in two key
ways. First, as the #MeToo movement shows, aggregation of claims results in
believability: one woman accusing a powerful man of sexual misconduct can be
easily dismissed, but hundreds of accusers are more difficult to ignore. Second,
aggregating claims can often demonstrate the institutional dimension of
discrimination, proving that discriminatory behavior is not due to a single bad
actor, but rather has been enabled by institutional structures that must be changed
to prevent the behavior from recurring.
A case brought by one individual against another, then, simply cannot carry
the “unique and powerful” symbolic importance of a class action.17 As the
feminist cry that “the personal is political”18 demonstrates, experiences that
appear singular are often manifestations of widespread systemic oppression. As
Patricia Hill Collins wrote, “[w]hile my individual experiences with
institutionalized racism [as a black woman] will be unique, the types of
opportunities and constraints that I encounter on a daily basis will resemble those
confronting African Americans as a group.”19 As a legal mechanism that
facilitates the aggregation of claims, class actions have incredible potential for
imbuing individual, personal harms with group, political meaning.
Some of the benefits of class actions have long been recognized: they
increase access to the courts, making actions more efficient and cheaper.20
Moreover, there is currently no other practicable way for very large groups to
resolve issues in a single litigation.21 But, as the above discussion illustrates,
16. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 348.
17. As Suzette Malveaux put it in her discussion of Dukes: “There is strength in numbers, especially
when that number is 1.5 million.” Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 35 (2011).
18. On the origins and significance of this phrase, see KERRY T. BURCH, DEMOCRATIC
TRANSFORMATIONS: EIGHTCONFLICTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OFAMERICAN IDENTITY ch. 8 (2012).
19. Patricia Hill Collins, Comment on Hekman’s ‘Truth and Method’: Feminist Standpoint Theory
Revisited’: Where’s the Power?, 22 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE& SOC’Y 375, 375 (1997).
20. Malveaux, supra note 17, at 35. See generally David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts:
Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (discussing the benefits of class
actions).
21. The federal rules gives federal courts the ability to break up one case into multiple actions “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). A judge faced with
a large group of plaintiffs who were not united as a class would likely exercise this power. Moreover,
even smaller numbers of plaintiffs might struggle to bring collective actions under Rule 20(a)(1), which
allows Permissive Joinder of Parties. Id. 20(a)(1). While there is technically no limit on how many
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class actions are also uniquely able to increase certain plaintiffs’ believability,
and the ability to uncover and provide redress for the institutional dimensions of
discrimination in a single action. By heightening the “commonality” requirement
for class action certification, then, Dukes has not merely decreased access to the
courts in certain cases. It has also made it exponentially more difficult for the
legal system to evaluate and redress claims brought by groups that are negatively
impacted by institutional discrimination.
Part I of this Comment explains howDukes raised the bar that plaintiffs must
meet in order to have “commonality” for the purposes of class certification. Part
II illustrates the stakes of this discussion by describing a class action that would
be barred under Dukes’ heightened commonality standard, and arguing that
alternative legal avenues fail to similarly increase the plaintiffs’ believability and
ability to show the institutional dimensions of bad behavior as much as a class
action. This Part focuses on an ongoing harm committed against a particularly
vulnerable group of women: the federal government’s consistent under-
investigation of sexual assaults against Native American women who live on
reservations. Part III discusses the limited legal avenues for collective
adjudication of gender discrimination claims post-Dukes.
I. BACKGROUND:WAL-MART V. DUKES
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) establishes several prerequisites for
class action certification, one of which is that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.”22 Prior to Dukes, lower courts disagreed over the
application of the commonality requirement in cases where employees claimed
that their employers’ policy of allowing managers to base decisions (such as
hiring or promotion) on their subjective evaluations of employees facilitated or
caused discrimination by allowing managers to abuse their authority.23 The
Supreme Court had last addressed the commonality requirement in General
plaintiffs may join an action under Rule 20(a)(1), in order to join an action as plaintiffs, persons must
demonstrate that they are asserting a right to relief “with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Id.Moreover, even if this standard is met, Rule 20(b)
gives the court the power to order separate trials “to protect a party against embarrassment, delay, expense,
or other prejudice.” Id. 20(b). Most states’ rules parallel the federal rules. Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is
Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002
UTAH L. REV. 249, 261 & n.52.
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). The other requirements are numerosity, typicality, and adequacy. See
id. (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members
only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”).
23. Daniel S. Klein, Note, Bridging the Falcon Gap: Do Claims of Subjective Decisionmaking in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions Satisfy the Rule 23(a) Commonality and Typicality
Requirements?, 25 REV. LITIG. 131, 133 (2006). But see Clegg, supra note 13, at 1089 (“Prior to [Dukes]
the commonality requirement . . . was not widely debated”).
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Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon.24 In a famous footnote, the Falcon
Court suggested that commonality could be satisfied by “[s]ignificant proof that
an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination . . . [that]
manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion,
such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.”25
Without additional guidance on this notoriously ambiguous footnote,26 the
lower courts split: some courts found that this type of subjective decisionmaking
policy supported a finding of commonality, while others concluded that the
inherently individual application of subjective decisionmaking meant putative
class members could not meet the commonality requirement for allegations of
discriminatory employment practices.27
Wal-Mart v. Dukes entered this contested landscape as the largest
employment class action lawsuit in American history.28 Female employees29
claimed that Wal-Mart’s policy of subjective decisionmaking by individual store
managers denied women equal pay and promotions in violation of Title VII.30
Because Wal-Mart was aware that its policy disadvantaged female employees,
the plaintiffs argued that its refusal to limit managers’ authority constituted
disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Plaintiffs
24. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
25. Id. at 159 n.15.
26. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 23, at 138 (referring to Falcon’s footnote fifteen as “oracular”).
27. Id. at 133-34.
28. Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases
Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 433 (2012).
29. This Comment focuses primarily on the gendered nature of the discrimination against the female
employees in Wal-Mart. However, it is important to acknowledge that this discrimination was facilitated
by the fact that female Wal-Mart employees were disadvantaged along other axes of oppression. For
instance, named plaintiff Betty Dukes, a black woman, was described by her niece upon her death as “a
voice fighting for equal rights and against racial and gender discrimination in the workplace.” Michael
Corkery, Betty Dukes, Greeter Whose Walmart Lawsuit Went to Supreme Court, Dies at 67, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2017) (emphasis added), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/business/betty-dukes-dead-
walmart-worker-led-landmark-class-action-sex-bias-case.html [https://perma.cc/RDX6-YMBX]. Named
plaintiff Cleo Page, also a black woman, described her struggle to remain afloat financially after being
unfairly passed over for promotions in favor of male applicants: without savings, she lost her house and
the foster children for whom she had been caring. Ritu Bhatnagar, Dukes v. Wal-Mart as a Catalyst for
Social Activism, 19 BERKELEYWOMEN’SL.J. 246, 246-47 (2004). Dukes’ and Page’s experiences are not
unique: Wal-Mart workers are overwhelmingly low-income—50 percent of Wal-Mart’s workforce is
composed of part-time workers, who receive lower pay and fewer benefits than full-time workers. Nandita
Bose, Half of Walmart’s Workforce are Part-Time Workers: Labor Group, REUTERS (May 25, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-workers/half-of-walmarts-workforce-are-part-time-workers-
labor-group-idUSKCN1IQ295 [https://perma.cc/RU92-XXLB]. Wal-Mart employees are among the
largest groups on food stamp subsidies. Id.According toWal-Mart, 43 percent of its domestic “associates”
are people of color and 55 percent are women. (Wal-Mart does not break down racial statistics by gender).
WALMART, Road to Inclusion: 2017 Culture, Diversity, and Inclusion Report 10, https://cdn.corporate.
walmart.com/11/0d/f9289df649049a38c14bdeaf2b99/2017-cdi-report-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3D6-7
EZZ].
30. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 343. The Court in Dukes also held that claims where monetary relief is not
incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), id. at 360, but
that portion of the holding is not relevant to this discussion. For more on this aspect of the opinion, see
Malveaux, supra note 17, at 45-52.
31. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 345 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
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further claimed that “a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’” was part of what
allowed bias against women to infect managers’ decisionmaking, “thereby
making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory
practice.”32
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, theDukes Court held that the plaintiffs failed
to provide “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated under a general policy of
discrimination.”33 Plaintiffs had provided the testimony of a sociological expert
that conducted a social framework analysis of Wal-Mart’s culture, but the Court
found the testimony insufficiently robust, and potentially inadmissible.34 The
Court was similarly unconvinced by statistics showing gender disparities in pay
and promotions, as well as 120 affidavits by female Wal-Mart employees
reporting discrimination.35
The Court further reasoned that Wal-Mart’s choice to allow managers’
subjective decisionmaking over employment matters was “just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a
class action,” since it was “a policy against having uniform employment
practices.”36 Under a subjective decisionmaking system, the Court wrote,
“demonstrating the invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion w[ould] do
nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s,” since each individual
manager was entirely free to make decisions based on (1) sex-neutral
performance-based criteria, (2) general aptitude tests or educational
achievements that produce disparate impact, or (3) intentional discrimination
against women.37 In short, the Court held that “[m]erely showing that Wal-
Mart’s policy of discretion ha[d] produced an overall sex-based disparity” was
insufficient to meet Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.38
In explaining its reasoning, the Court noted that the commonality
requirement is met when
claims . . . depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it
is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.39
32. Id.
33. Id. at 353.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 358. As Malveaux points out, “by analyzing each type of evidence in isolation to determine
whether it provided ‘significant proof’ of a general discriminatory policy, the Court diminished the overall
import of plaintiffs’ evidence.” Malveaux, supra note 17, at 39 (emphasis added). For a critique of the
majority’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ evidence, see id. at 39-43.
36. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 355.
37. Id. at 356.
38. Id. at 357.
39. Id. at 350.
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In other words, class certification depends not on “the raising of common
‘questions,’” but on “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”40 This holding has been
roundly criticized for incorporating the Rule 23(b)(2) “predominance
requirement” into the 23(a)(2) commonality analysis.41
Some commentators have nevertheless interpreted Dukes narrowly as
holding that “a system of delegated decision-making that produces large
statistical disparities cannot furnish the requisite commonality to support a class
action, even where the corporate culture is infected by gender stereotypes.”42
However, the principle that commonality exists only when the outcome of a class
action turns on claims having the same answers (i.e., is “capable of a classwide
resolution”)43 has implications that reach far beyond subjective decisionmaking
class actions.
As Roger Reinsch and Sonia Goltz have noted, Dukes’s heightened
commonality requirement is most likely to negatively impact cases that involve
second-generation discrimination.44 Unlike first-generation discrimination,
which “involves easily recognizable, blatant discrimination,” such as “the
exclusionary sign on the door,”45 second-generation discrimination “cannot be
reduced to a single, universal, or simple theory of discrimination.”46 Second-
generation discrimination is “subtler and involves patterns of interaction that
exclude certain groups over time. . . [It is] structural, situational, and hard to
identify.”47 The company policy the plaintiffs challenged in Dukes is a
“classic”48 example of second-generation discrimination.
It is highly unlikely that Dukes will make cases involving first-generation
discrimination more difficult. Imagine, for instance, a company that sends out a
memo telling all supervisors that women could not be promoted to managerial
positions because they are too emotional. Adjudicating these employees’ claim
of discrimination would clearly involve a common contention the truth or falsity
of which would resolve an issue that is central to each of the claims in one
stroke.49
40. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
41. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 13, at 1105; Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO.
L. J. 759, 794-800 (2012). The dissent also makes this point. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 376.
42. Tippett, supra note 28, at 434.
43 Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 350.
44. Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There From Here: Implications of theWalmart
v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation Discrimination, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 264
(2014).
45. Id. at 281 (quoting Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 473 (2011)).
46. Id. at 281.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 350.
2018] The Feminist Case Against Individualized Adjudication 409
Second-generation discrimination is more subtle and likely to manifest in a
variety of different ways, making it unlikely that such claims will meet Dukes’s
stringent commonality standard. And yet, as the next Part argues, it is claims of
second-generation discrimination that benefit most from aggregation. Alone, a
claim of second-generation discrimination can be easily dismissed as caused by
other factors, such as singular bad actors or the existence of larger societal factors
disadvantaging a particular group. However, when numerous claims of second-
generation discrimination are placed together, it becomes clear that the problem
is not only driven by a few bad actors, but also enabled by institutional structures.
II. THE IMPOSSIBLECLASS ACTION
Consider the problem of sexual violence against Native American women
on reservations. According to the Department of Justice, 35 percent of American
Indian and Alaska Native women have experienced sexual violence with
penetration.50 Native women are thus 1.7 times more likely than non-Hispanic
White women to be victims of sexual violence.51 The complicated legal
relationship between the U.S. government and Native tribes means that the task
of prosecuting sexual assaults on reservations typically falls on the federal
government,52 and there is some evidence suggesting that the federal government
systematically under-enforces sexual assault laws on Native American
reservations. Federal prosecutors decline to prosecute 26 percent of cases filed
in federal court, but decline to prosecute sexual assaults against Native women
on tribal reservations 65 percent of the time.53 This is likely because federal
agents are reluctant to take on such cases.54 As former U.S. Attorney Margaret
Chiara observes, Assistant U.S. Attorneys “want to do big drug cases, white-
collar crimes, and conspiracy,” while federal judges “look at these Indian
Country cases and say, ‘What is this doing here? I could have stayed in state
court if I wanted this stuff.’”55
Imagine that Native women who have been victims of rape wish to sue the
federal government for consistently failing to adequately investigate sexual
assault on the reservation in which they live. Such a lawsuit would not be entirely
unprecedented—in Cole v. Oravec, the families of two Native murder victims
sued an FBI investigator for consistently under-investigating murder cases
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., VIOLENCEAGAINSTAMERICAN INDIANANDALASKANATIVEWOMENAND
MEN, 14 TBL. 2.1 (2016).
51. Id.
52. Jasmine Owens, ‘Historic’ in a Bad Way: How the Tribal Law and Order Act Continues the
American Tradition of Providing Inadequate Protection to American Indian and Alaska Native Rape
Victims, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 504-508 (2012).
53. Id. at 512
54. Id. at 511.
55. Id. (quoting Bill Moyers Journal, PBS television broadcast (Nov. 14, 2008) (transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11142008/transcript4.html [https://perma.cc/T5NE-9MP4]).
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involving Native American victims.56 Because a class action is more efficient
and less expensive than individual lawsuits, the impacted women seek 23(b)(2)
certification.57
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes, it is difficult to see how such
a class could ever be certified. Dukes construes the 23(a)(2) requirement that
there be “questions of law or fact common to the class” extremely narrowly.
Since the women would likely be alleging discriminatory under-investigation by
several officials (much as the women in Dukes alleged employment
discrimination by different supervisors), the class would likely fail the
commonality requirement. In a case such as this, as in Dukes, each official could
argue that their behavior was motivated by permissible (rather than
discriminatory) reasons. Thus, as the Court held in Dukes, a class-wide
proceeding could not generate a “common answer.” 58
Certainly, one of the impacted Native women could file a lawsuit asserting
the same claims against an individual investigator, as occurred in Oravec.
However, the focus of the trial would center on the decisionmaking of the
specific federal investigator that investigated the woman’s claim. Such a case
likely would not bring to light any evidence that the federal government as an
institution consistently fails to adequately investigate and prosecute sexual
assault on Native American reservations.
Sexual assaults against Native women in the U.S. have been committed with
impunity for centuries, and there is great historical significance in “the ongoing
rape [of Native women] and [the] colonization of their tribes.”59 One lawsuit
against a single federal prosecutor for failing to pursue a Native woman’s rape
case can be dismissed as an isolated instance of discrimination, or as justified by
the facts of that woman’s assault. In contrast, a class action lawsuit brought by
Native women against the federal government would not only make the problem
of systematic under-enforcement of their sexual assaults impossible to ignore,
but also situate this problem within the broader history of American exploitation
of and violence towards Native tribes.
By privileging individual over group adjudication, Dukes’ heightened
commonality requirement has stripped class actions of much of this symbolic
potential, and reduced their ability to hold institutions (rather than merely
individuals) accountable for discriminatory conduct. Thus, Dukes greatly
56. 465 Fed. Appx. 687 (9th Cir. 2012). The suit was a Bivens action seeking damages for equal
protection violations under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at 688. For a detailed description
of the case, see Adrian Jawort, Parents in Crow Reservation Death Still Seeking Justice, LASTBESTNEWS
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://lastbestnews.com/2017/01/parents-in-crow-reservation-death-still-seeking-justice/
[https://perma.cc/GY2P-YYB9].
57. Their attorney decides the predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) is best avoided—if the
class action is won, monetary damages can be sought on a case-by-case basis.
58. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
59. Owens, supra note 52, at 503.
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abridged one mechanism through which marginalized groups could assert their
rights, limiting the degree to which collective storytelling can challenge the
“normal,” “objective,” “individualistic” focus of adjudication.
III. MOVING FORWARD: OPTIONS FORCOLLECTIVEADJUDICATION POST-
DUKES
Commentators are split on the real-world impact of Dukes. On the one hand,
Title VII “pattern or practice claims” like that brought in Dukes can still be
brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is exempt
from class action certification requirements.60 Moreover, class actions the size
ofDukes are extremely rare.61On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ theory of liability
inDukes is fairly common, raising concerns that judges may useDukes to require
“a stronger causal connection between an employer’s discretionary
decisionmaking policy and a disparity or adverse employment action,” making
it more difficult for employees relying on this theory to act collectively.62
While Dukes would seem to make it quite difficult to seek redress based on
the discretionary actions of multiple individuals within an organization,63 not all
hope is lost. For one, some courts have read the case fairly narrowly.
Approximately 2,000 plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination in pay and
promotions at Goldman Sachs were recently awarded partial class certification.64
District Judge Analisa Torres distinguished Dukes because that case lacked a
“common . . . evaluation procedure” used to discriminate against the plaintiffs,65
whereas the Goldman Sachs plaintiffs were all subject to common “360 review,”
“quartiling,” and “cross-ruffing” evaluation processes.66
Moreover, multiple plaintiffs remain able to hold institutions accountable,
though to a lesser degree. In the #MeToo context, three women have filed a class
action suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Harvey
60. See e.g., Tippett, supra note 28, at 443 (explaining that Title VII “pattern or practice claims” like
that brought in Dukes can still be brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is
exempt from class action certification requirements). But see Malveaux, supra note 17, at 37 (noting that
“government agencies—burdened by budgetary and political constraints—often cannot fill the gap left by
the lack of private enforcement”).
61. Malveaux, supra note 17, at 44.
62. Id. at 44-45.
63. See supra Parts I & II.
64. Chen-Oster et al. v. Goldman Sachs & Co. et al., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018),
available at http://goldmangendercase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Dkt_578-OPINION-AND-ORD
ER.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWG2-5WP9]; see also Jonathan Stempel,U.S. Judge Certifies Goldman Sachs
Gender Bias Class Action, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-sachs-
bias-lawsuit/u-s-judge-certifies-goldman-sachs-gender-bias-class-action-idUSKBN1H61SN [https://per
ma.cc/WEN8-VKNE].
65. Chen-Oster, No. 10 Civ. 6950 at 26.
66. Id. at 27.
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Weinstein and the company he owned, Miramax.67 Because the complaint
primarily brings claims against the company for knowingly enabling a single bad
actor, it poses a question that determines the claims of all class members: namely,
what did Miramax executives know about Weinstein’s actions, and when did
they acquire this knowledge? Thus, this class action likely does meet the Dukes
standard.
All in all, then, avenues for change remain open for those seeking to
challenge institutional discrimination. Even in the wake ofDukes, there are non-
legal mechanisms through which institutions can be held accountable for
discriminatory conduct. Google recently ended its practice of forced arbitration
for claims of sexual harassment or assault after 20,000 employees walked out in
protest.68 However, Dukes’s prioritization of individualized adjudication has
come at a cost. Those who seek to bring claims of second-generation
discrimination against institutions have lost some of the key benefits of a class
action—increases in efficiency, access to the courts, believability, and the ability
to prove institutional dimension of discrimination.
67. Harvey Weinstein Faces New Rape Accusation in Class Action Lawsuit, GUARDIAN (June 1,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/jun/01/harvey-weinstein-accusation-lawsuit-latest [https:
//perma.cc/S6QQ-EP9T].
68. Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy After
Employee Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/technology/google
-arbitration-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/K3L8-TYU9].
